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On January 1, 1998, California will be the first state to deregulate its electricity
industry. Deregulation is expected to reduce the high rates paid throughout the state by
allowing competition, not regulators, to determine rates.
Deregulation will dissolve the monopoly of the electricity industry by allowing
customers to choose who will supply their electricity. Competition will emerge in the
generation market, where transactions between consumers and suppliers will be free and
open. Under regulation, most customers do not have a choice in their electricity supplier.
Their supplier is usually determined by their geographic location.
This thesis researches the differences between the regulated and deregulated rate
structures and provides a cost comparison for a Navy organization classified as a large
commercial/industrial user of electricity.
There are many aspects of deregulation that are not yet determined, but the initial
comparison indicates deregulation may save Navy installations money. If deregulation
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Navy installations spend a significant amount of their Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) budgets on utilities and, in particular, electricity. For
example, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) may spend less than seven percent of its
non-labor 0&M,N budget on electricity, but that percentage actually equates to over $1
million a year. Therefore, any reduction in electricity consumption may produce
significant cost savings. As a result, commands adopt energy conscious programs to
reduce electricity consumption and, ultimately, the costs. Unfortunately, these programs
can only reduce wasteful electricity consumption. Additionally, no matter how energy
conscious a command may be, there are still environmental factors that affect
consumption and over which the command has no control. Therefore, commands can
only reduce their consumption and costs by a certain amount.
Another component which affects the amount installations pay for electricity is
the rate schedule. In California, approximately 80 percent of all electricity service is
provided by three investor owned utilities (IOUs), Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern
California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric [Ref. 1 :p. 2]. These companies are
given exclusive rights to provide electricity to specific geographic areas. Since these
rights create monopolistic markets, the state invokes regulation as a surrogate for
competition. Regulation controls all aspects of the IOUs' operations, which includes
setting the rate schedules. Therefore, the rates customers pay for electricity depend on
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their geographic location, which dictates their electricity supplier and ultimately their rate
schedule.
California legislators believe that the electricity rates paid in California are too
high and have responded with Assembly Bill 1 890. This bill, which was signed into law
on September 23, 1996, will deregulate the electricity industry by breaking up the three
IOUs and allow other electricity suppliers to compete for retail customers. It is believed
that deregulation will decrease electricity rates because competition will determine the
price, not regulation. IfNavy installations could reduce their electricity rates, the savings
would be genuine.
This thesis researched how electricity rates are determined under regulation, how
deregulation will affect those rates, and whether Navy installations in California will
realize lower electricity costs under deregulation.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: Will Navy installations, which receive
electricity from one of California's three IOUs, save money as a result of deregulation?
Secondary research question are:
1
.
What laws and regulations govern California's electricity industry?
2. How does California plan to deregulate its electricity industry?
3. How will the electricity rate structure for Navy installations change under
deregulation?
C. METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted in three parts. First, a review was made of the
regulated rate setting procedures for the IOUs. This was accomplished through a rate
case for Southern California Edison decided by the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC). Second, information on how California plans to deregulate the
electricity industry was reviewed. Deregulation information was obtained through
various sources, such as Assembly Bill 1890, the 1994 Electricity Report prepared by the
California Energy Commission, and an Internet' site managed by the CPUC. The CPUC
site contains a wealth of information about the operations and proceedings of the CPUC,
as well as a dedicated section for deregulation. Third, a cost comparison between a
regulated rate schedule and deregulation was conducted for a Navy organization in order
to determine what type of cost savings, if any, may be realized.
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is the thesis background,
methodology, and structure. Chapter II concentrates on the regulated electricity industry.
It provides the reader a brief background on why the industry is regulated and how rates
are determined by the regulators.
Chapter III contains the theory and method by which California will deregulate
the industry. It discusses what aspects of the industry will change and how the rates will
be determined. Chapter IV compares the cost of electricity for the Naval Postgraduate -
School's Main Station, which is classified as a large commercial/industrial user of
electricity. This chapter applies a baseline forecast to the applicable rate schedule and to
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the projected cost of electricity after deregulation. Chapter V contains the conclusions
and recommendations from the study.
II. CALIFORNIA'S REGULATED ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the century, vast applications for electricity were just starting to be
realized. People then believed that, because of its natural characteristics, the emerging
industry could best serve the public as a monopoly. For example, multiple transmission
lines throughout neighborhoods, each provided by different companies competing for the
same business, were thought to be inefficient. Additionally, multiple transmission lines
running throughout every neighborhood would have been unsightly. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
The characteristics of the electric industry that naturally lend themselves to
monopolistic behavior also provide economic benefits. Single transmission lines are
economically more efficient for two reasons. First, single transmission lines reduce the
amount of electricity lost during transmission. Second, resources are not wasted on
duplicate lines. [Ref. 3]
However, the absence of competition, or existence of a monopoly, can also have
detrimental effects on a free market economy. Society is essentially a captured market
because the good or service can not be received by any other means. A monopoly is free
to set any price and is often not responsive to customer needs. This may lead to a
breakdown in areas such as safety, quality of service, and, most importantly, inefficient
use of valuable resources.
B. UTILITY REGULATION
In an attempt to protect the captured market from the monopolists' rule, the
government imposes regulation. Regulation is designed to simulate the characteristics of
a competitive market by regulating all aspects of the industry, from rates to the quality of
service provided. Today, the electric industry is regulated nationally by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and in California by the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC).
1. Federal Regulation
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a division within the Department
of Energy. The commission was established in 1 977 by the Department of Energy
Organization Act. Its charter is to regulate the transmission of natural gas and oil and the
transmission and wholesale market for electricity in interstate commerce; to inspect and
license private, municipal and state hydroelectric projects; and to oversee related
environmental matters. The Commission ensures that wholesale electric rates, service
standards, and electricity transmission through interstate commerce are conducted in
accordance with federal laws. In summary, FERC regulates interstate utility transactions
and claims no jurisdiction over electric rate setting within the states. [Ref. 4:p. 1 ]
2. State Regulation
The California Public Utilities Commission was originally established as the
Railroad Commission in 191 1. In 1946, its name was changed to the CPUC and it was
empowered to regulate the utilities and transportation services within the state. The
CPUC's decision-making body is its Board of Directors. The board includes five
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members, each appointed by the governor and approved by the senate. Each member
serves a six year term. [Ref. 5:p. 1]
The CPUC's job is to protect consumers from electric and transportation
monopolies by regulating safety, standards of service, and rates. The Commission must
also consider the financial status of the investor-owned utilities. It must allow utility
companies to recover their operating costs and capital costs and still provide a reasonable
rate of return for their shareholders. Therefore, the Commission must balance the public
interest and the utilities' interests when setting electric rates. [Ref. 5:p. 1]
C. RATEMAKING
The California Public Utilities Commission spends a great deal of time and
resources reviewing utilities' applications for rate increases. These applications
presumably are not attempts by the utilities to increase profits, but substantiated requests
to adjust rates to meet their revenue requirement. During the review process, several
contrasting ratemaking policies may be employed, depending on one's outlook. The
method CPUC uses is a marginal cost-based ratemaking policy. [Ref. 6:p. 3] This policy
is designed to "achieve rates which reflect the costs that the customer imposes on the
system." [Ref. 6:p. 20]
The theory behind marginal cost is that economic efficiency will occur if goods
are priced at the point where the cost to produce one additional unit is equal to the benefit
received from consuming that unit. Therefore, the CPUC's objective is to set the price of
electricity at an optimal point where the quantity of electricity consumed is equal to the
amount produced and the marginal cost of the last unit produced equals the marginal
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value of that unit to consumers. If this objective is met, then the proper amount of
resources will be allocated to the electric industry. [Ref. 6: Attach. 3,pp. 1-3]
The marginal cost ratemaking policy has been used by the CPUC since 1981.
This policy distributes electric costs in the most equitable manner, while providing
customers with information about their electricity consumption. The marginal-cost
ratemaking process is divided into two parts. They are:
1
.
Establish the revenue requirement.
2. Allocate the established revenue requirement. [Ref. 6:p. 13]
The following subsections will discuss each part of this process, as illustrated in
Figure 1.
1. Establish the Revenue Requirement
The revenue requirement is the total of all current costs to the utility, which
include: operation and maintenance, fuel, taxes, depreciation, interest payments, and an
allowance for return on equity. These costs, or expenses, are referred to as embedded
costs and equal the amount authorized by the CPUC to be recovered through electricity













































Figure 1. Marginal Cost of Service Ratemaking.
2. Allocate the Revenue Requirement
The allocation process is a four step procedure which determines how the
authorized revenue requirement will be spread between rate groups. The four steps are:
a. Determine marginal cost of service.
b. Determine marginal cost of service responsibility.
c. Allocate the revenue requirement between rate groups.
d. Set rates within rate groups. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
The following explains each step in more detail:
a. Determine Marginal Cost ofService.
The marginal cost of service is determined by the marginal costs of its
three principal components, energy, demand, and customer-related costs.
(1) Energy. The marginal cost of energy is defined as the
additional cost incurred to produce one additional unit of electricity, measured as a
kilowatt hour (kWh). The cost of energy is variable, depending on the time of day and
season. Marginal energy costs include the cost of fuel plus variable operation and
maintenance expenses. [Ref. 6:p. 24]
(2) Demand. Demand is the level of capacity needed to meet
the workload. Because electricity is difficult and expensive to store, electricity must be
instantaneously generated in order to meet the current demand on the system. If demand
were to exceed system capacity, blackouts and/or greyouts could ensue.
The marginal cost of demand is the additional cost incurred to
produce one additional unit of demand measured as a kilowatt (kW). The marginal cost
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of demand is determined by the marginal costs of generation, transmission, and
distribution.
(a) Generation.
Generation is the process that provides electricity to the system.
The process is accomplished by various methods such as hydroelectric, nuclear, and
fossil-fired. The CPUC defines the marginal cost of generation as ". . . the change in total
costs of providing dependable capability to deliver energy from the generating system."
[Ref. 6:pp. 51-52]
(b) Transmission.
Transmission is the process of transporting high-voltage electricity
from the generation facility to the distribution point. California's transmission lines are
complex networks interconnected throughout the western United States. These networks
allow interconnection between generating plants and provide backup electricity in times
of emergencies. [Ref. 2:p. 11]
The marginal cost of transmission was not originally calculated as
part of the system marginal costs. In 1982, however, the California Public Utilities
Commission decided that transmission costs should be added to system marginal costs.
As kW demand increases, transmission lines reach their capacity, increasing the
probability of a system shortage. Therefore, customers should bear the costs they impose
on the limits of the transmission lines by the relationship between new plant investment
and transmission load growth. [Ref. 6:p. 56]
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(c ) Distribution.
From the transmission lines, electricity is transferred to the
distribution system via substations. Substations are used to reduce the high-voltage
electricity from the transmission lines to lower voltages used by the distribution system.
A distribution system consists of primary and secondary lines which distribute electricity
to distribution transformers. The distribution transformers reduce the voltages to usable
levels for end users. Marginal distribution costs are determined in the same manner as
transmission marginal costs.
(3) Customer-Related Costs. The final marginal cost is
customer-related costs. These costs measure the change in total costs required to provide
access to the system for new customers and the costs to maintain current customers.
Examples of customer costs include customer equipment, customer service, and
accounting expense. [Ref. 6:p. 24] Customer-related costs are estimated by a "new
customer only" (NCO) method. This method assigns the lump sum cost for new hook-
ups to each group based on the number of new customers and estimated replacements.
Current costs are estimated based on the total number of customers in the rate group. The
marginal customer related costs are the sum of the NCO cost and current costs for each
group. [Ref. 6:pp. 62-69]
b. Determine Marginal Cost ofService Responsibility
The marginal cost of service responsibility assigns each rate group
responsibility for the marginal costs incurred by the utility. This is referred to as the
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Marginal Cost Revenue Responsibility (MCRR). The MCRR is a percent which
represents a rate group's contribution towards total marginal costs. [Ref. 6:pp. 23-24]
c. Allocate Revenue Requirement Between Rate Groups
The allocation of revenue requirement distributes the revenue requirement
between the rate groups. This is accomplished by a method called equal percent marginal
cost (EPMC). The EPMC allocates the revenue requirement based on each rate group's
MCRR. For example, if a rate group's MCRR is 35 percent then the revenue requirement
for that group will be calculated based on 35 percent. [Ref. 6:p. 6]
d. Set Rates Within Rate Groups
Utility customers are divided into service categories called rate groups.
Rate groups consist of customers who receive similar service based on their energy needs
and usage. Each rate group is further divided into specific rate schedules. These
schedules will define, at a minimum, the applicability, territory, rates, and special
conditions that may apply to the type of service. The rate schedules are the vehicle used
to distribute the rate group's assigned revenue requirement.
Each IOU has unique rate schedules which apply to its customers. This is
because each utility's customer base and authorized revenue requirements are different.
Regardless of the differences between the rate schedules, the type of charges are the
same. The primary charges that comprise a customer's bill are:





These charges are not inclusive for all schedules but are applied as the
CPUC distributes the revenue requirement within the rate group. Each charge is
discussed in further detail in the following subsections:
(1) Minimum or Basic Charge. The minimum or basic charge
recovers a minimum amount of revenue for customer related costs, such as metering and
billing. This charge normally applies to domestic service.
(2) Customer Charge. The customer charge applies to all
customers except domestic and is also used to recover customer related charges. This
charge is normally a fixed cost.
(3) Demand Charge. The demand charge, which recovers the
component costs of demand as discussed above, is based upon coincidental and non-
coincidental customer demand. Coincidental demand is the customer's demand which
contributes to generation peak demand. The coincidental demand charge is usually "time
of use" (TOU) related and increases from off-peak, to partial-peak, and peak,
respectively. [Ref. 6: p. 57]
Non-coincidental demand is the customer's maximum demand
placed on the local distribution system. The non-coincidental demand, or facilities-
related charge, is TOU independent and is a flat fee dependent on the maximum demand
during the period. The customer's demand charge will be the total of the coincidental and
facilities-related charges. [Ref. 6:p. 57]
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(4) Energy Charge. Energy charges apply to all customers and
are designed to recover the cost of fuel, operations and maintenance, and the remainder of
the revenue requirement not yet recovered by customer charges and demand charges. The
charges are structured to recover the energy costs within each rate group in a manner that
best represents the energy usage characteristics of the group's customers. The CPUC
employs different allocation methods to meet its goals. Four methods are predominant in
the rate schedules. They are: (a) baseline, (b) flat rate, (c) declining block, and (d) time-
of-use.
(a) Baseline Rates.
The baseline method applies to domestic users and provides a
minimum quantity of electricity at a low rate. The schedule is structured into two tiers.
The first tier provides the minimum quantity of energy at the low rate, while the second
tier sets a higher rate for all energy usage above the minimum. The monthly energy
charge for this schedule is the total of tier one and tier two costs. The baseline rate and
quantity will vary according to utility, climate, and season and is employed throughout
California.
(b) Simple Block.
The simple block or flat rate method charges one rate for all energy
use. This method has restricted applications based on customer demand and monthly
energy use. For example, San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGE) flat rate schedule applies
only to customers whose monthly demand is less than 20 kW and monthly consumption
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less than 12,000 kWh. Energy cost under this schedule is the single set rate times the
consumption. [Ref. 7]
( c) Declining Block.
The declining block method is a consumption based rate structure.
This method divides energy consumption into blocks and charges a corresponding rate for
consumption within that block. Because the cost to produce energy decreases with
increased volume, the block rates decline as consumption increases. This method usually
applies to customers with monthly demand greater than 20 kW but less than 500 kW.
(d) Time-of-Use.
The last method of rate allocation is the time-of-use (TOU)
schedule. TOU schedules charge energy consumption based on the time of day in which
it is used. The most common TOU schedules divide the day into peak, partial peak, and
off peak periods. These periods will vary depending on time of day, region, climate, and
season. The peak period is when energy use is the highest; therefore it equates to the
highest rate. The off peak period is when energy use is the lowest and corresponds to the
lowest rate. The primary applicants for TOU schedules are large power users with
monthly demand greater than 500 kW. Table 1 is an example of the TOU time periods
used by San Diego Gas and Electric.
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Period Summer May 1 - Sept. 30 Winter All other
Peak 1 1 a.m. - 6 p.m. Weekdays 5 p.m. - 8 p.m. Weekdays
Partial Peak 6.a.m. - 11a.m. Weekdays
6 p.m. - 10 p.m. Weekdays
6 a.m. - 5 p.m. Weekdays
8 p.m. - 10 p.m. Weekdays
Off Peak 10 p.m. - 6 a.m. Weekdays
Plus Weekends & Holidays
10 p.m. - 6 a.m. Weekdays
Plus Weekends & Holidays
Table 1. San Diego Gas and Electric Time Periods. (SDGE Schedule A6-TOU)
D. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the ratemaking process determines the amount of revenue the
utility is allowed to generate based on its current costs plus an amount to ensure a
reasonable return on equity. The process then determines the marginal costs and assigns
the marginal cost revenue responsibility to each rate group. The revenue requirement is




III. CALIFORNIA'S DEREGULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
On September 23, 1996, the governor of California signed Assembly Bill 1890
(AB 1890). This legislation will deregulate nearly 80 percent of electricity service
provided by California's three investor-owned utilities (IOUs), specifically Pacific Gas
and Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas and Electric
(SDG&E). [Ref. l:p. 1]
This bill was created in response to the high electricity rates paid in California and
the changing composition of the electricity industry. California lawmakers and customers
were frustrated with the electricity rates paid in California compared to the rest of the
country. The average California electric bill is lower than the national average.
However, California electricity rates are 40 percent higher. [Ref. 8:pp. 1-4] This is due
in part to the stringent energy conservation measures and energy efficiency programs
adopted by California. These programs reduce energy consumption but result in higher
rates because the fixed costs of the IOUs must be spread over the lower energy
consumption. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
Legislation, such as the Energy Policy Act of 1 992 (EPAct), has shifted the
paradigm of the electric industry. The EPAct provided wholesale electricity generators
nondiscriminatory access to the transmission grid at reasonable rates. This effort
increased competition and lowered rates within the wholesale generation market created
by nonutility generators. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
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The California Energy Commission (CEC) believes lower electricity rates are
essential to the well being of the state. The CEC states,
Energy is essential to California's economy. The state's long-term economic
growth relies on, among other factors, an adequate and stable supply of energy in
all major forms: transportation fuels, electricity and natural gas. It is time for
reform. California needs stable energy prices, as low as can be achieved
consistent with concern for the environmental impacts of energy use, as part of the
foundation for a sound economy, new industries, jobs and export opportunities for
California's businesses. [Ref. 9:p. 6]
Today, regulation controls every aspect of the electricity industry. The issues
regarding who will provide service to whom, how much customers will pay for
electricity, and even where and how many power plants will be built are all decided by
regulation. The theory behind the deregulation of electricity is to allow the natural forces
of supply and demand to control the electric industry. State authorities are optimistic that
these forces will increase economic efficiency and ultimately reduce rates. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
B. DEREGULATION
The deregulation of electricity will permit electricity suppliers to compete for
retail customers. Under regulation, the investor-owned utilities (IOUs) provide electricity
to customers according to the customers' geographic location. Each IOU receives
exclusive rights to serve specific locations. However, in return for these rights each IOU
must provide service to all customers within that area. Under this situation, if the
customer chooses to receive electricity, it must be from the utility with the rights to serve
that location. Deregulation will dissolve these exclusive rights and allow virtually all
utilities access to all regions. The customers will be able to choose their electricity
supplier.
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It is essential to the success of deregulation that competitive markets exist where
transactions are free and open between suppliers and consumers. This will likely prove to
be the biggest challenge for deregulation. California's IOUs have evolved, with the help
of regulation, into vertically-integrated corporations. This means generation,
transmission, distribution, and customer services are all provided by a single utility
company. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-9]
The vertical-integration of the utilities provides substantial market power, which
makes it difficult for smaller companies to compete. For a truly competitive market to
exist, the vertical-integration of these utilities must be dissolved. This will be
accomplished by "unbundling" each component of electricity service. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
C. ASSEMBLY BILL 1890
Assembly Bill 1 890 (AB 1 890) states that three situations must occur in order for
a competitive generation market to exist. They are:
1
.
Separate monopoly utility transmission functions from competitive generation
functions, by developing independent, third-party control of transmission
access and pricing.
2. Permit all customers to choose among competing electric power suppliers.
3. Provide customers and suppliers with open, nondiscriminatory, and
comparable access to transmission and distribution services. [Ref. 10: Section
330.k]
These situations depend on separating generation, transmission, and distribution
from the vertically-integrated IOUs. The legislation accomplishes this separation by
establishing two government agencies, an Independent System Operator (ISO) and Power
Exchange (PX).
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1. Independent System Operator
The Independent System Operator (ISO) will function as the central coordinator
for electricity transmission. It will coordinate the operations of the electricity network to
ensure that safety and reliability standards are maintained. This will be accomplished by
the IOUs transferring control of their transmission facilities to the ISO. The ISO will
operate as an independent entity controlled by regulation. [Ref. 10:Section 330.m]
In addition to network coordination, the ISO will act as a dispatch service for
electricity. This service will maintain system reliability by purchasing electricity to meet
any differences between the system's supply and demand. The dispatch service will
decide where to purchase electricity, based on the lowest bid from the generation market.
[Ref. 6:p. 15]
The establishment of the ISO is designed to break the vertical-integration of the
IOUs by separating generation from transmission. This will allow all generation
suppliers open access to the network, thereby providing the necessary connection
between generation and retail customers without IOU intervention.
2. Power Exchange
Assembly Bill 1 890 establishes a competitive auction service to dispatch
electricity generation, called the Power Exchange (PX). The PX will serve as a mediator
for generators with excess capacity and retail suppliers. The PX will accomplish this
through an open bid auction where generators bid excess capacity through the PX. Retail
suppliers will also bid through the PX, but they will do so with demand requirements.
22
The PX will match the demand of the retail suppliers with the lowest generation bids.
[Ref. llrSection III.B.2]
Introducing the ISO will separate the vertically-integrated IOUs, but the
California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) is also concerned about the horizontal
market power the IOUs will have in the generation market. The CPUC states,
There is a need to ensure that no participant in these new market institutions has
the ability to exercise significant market power so that operation of the new
market institutions would be distorted. [Ref. 12:Section II.D]
The CPUC will implement two policies to prevent the IOUs from exercising
generation market power. First, the IOUs will be required to divest themselves of 50
percent of their fossil-fired generating facilities. Second, a mandatory buy-sell policy
will require the IOUs to bid all their generation through the PX. In return, the IOUs will
buy electricity back from the PX to meet their customers' demand. [Ref. 12:Section II.
B
-II.D.l]
D. ELECTRICITY RATES UNDER DEREGULATION
Deregulation will promote competition within the electricity industry by
unbundling the components of electricity service. Competition will emerge primarily in
the generation market, which is where customers will choose who will supply their
electricity. Transmission anil distribution are critical to system reliability, and therefore
will remain regulated. Because each component of electricity service may be provided by
different companies, electric bills may reflect the separate costs of generation,
transmission, distribution, and customer-related costs. Additionally, AB 1 890 has
authorized a Competitive Transition Charge (CTC) to be added to all customers' bills
during a specified transition period.
1. Generation
Customers may choose between various electricity suppliers such as the local
utility, the PX, and retail suppliers. Once an electricity supplier is chosen, the customers
will enter into a bilateral contract with that supplier. Three contract options the customer
may choose are:
a. Retain local utility service.
b. Stabilize price through financial hedging.
c. Direct access. [Ref. ll:Section I.B.I]
The theory behind each contract option will be discussed in further detail below:
a. Retain Local Utility Service
Under this contract, customers will retain all services from their local
utility company. The local utility will be responsible for providing all services from
generation to distribution and will charge the customer for the bundle of services.
Residential and small commercial customers will have an additional choice between
block rates or time-of-use (TOU) billing. TOU rates were not available for these
customers under regulation.
The cost of electricity will be determined by the market rate. If a customer
is not satisfied with the local utility rate, the customer may choose a new supplier. [Ref.
ll:Section I.B.I]
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b. Stabilize Price Through Financial Hedging.
Customers who are concerned about price stability within the competitive
electricity market may enter into a hedging contract with a third party. Customers who
enter into this type of contract will continue to receive bills from their local utility
company. However, periodically bills will be totaled and compared to the hedged
contract price. The third party will pay the customer for any amount greater than the
hedged price. Conversely, the customer will pay the third party for any amount less than
the contract price. Under this contract, the customer will be able to predict electricity
costs independent of market fluctuations. [Ref. 1 1 :Section I.B.2]
c. Direct Access
Direct access will provide retail customers the opportunity to negotiate the
price of electricity directly from suppliers. The retail customer and the supplier will
decide on the terms and conditions of a direct access contract without government
intervention. Direct access will open the generation market to competition. Utilities will
compete for retail business against other utilities and nonutility generators. As such, the
generation market will be open to anyone willing to compete and not just electricity
producers. [Ref. 1 1 :Section LB.3]
Direct access contracts must also include the local utility, which must
deliver the electricity from the supplier to the customer. The CPUC believes that, as long
as mutually satisfactory contract arrangements are made among the customer, supplier,
and local utility, there is no need for government involvement. [Ref. 1 1 :Section LB. 3]
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2. Transmission
As stated above, the Independent System Operator (ISO) will control the
transmission facilities to allow non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid. The
ISO will determine the cost for using the transmission network based on the marginal
cost of generation at different locations.
The following is an example ofhow the marginal costs of different locations will
operate. This example is taken from the California Energy Commission, 1994 Energy
Report:
Suppose the price of generation at location A is 3 cents per kilowatt hour
and the price at location B is 5 cents per kilowatt hour. If there are no
transmission constraints and enough generation at A, a customer at either A or B
should pay only 3 cents for generation. But suppose there was insufficient
transmission between A and B, so that not all the 3 -cent generation consumers
wanted from A could get to B. In that case, the price of generation for consumer
at A would still be 3 cents; but the price for a customer located at B would be 5
cents.
If a consumer at B sought to purchase power from a 3-cent generator at A,
it could sign a contract to pay 3 cents for the generation, but it would not be able
to receive all of that power; that is, some portion of the generator's 3-cent power
could not be physically transmitted to B because of network constraints. To
enable the consumer at B to get its remaining power, generation at B would have
to be used and its price would be 5 cents, raising the spot price for power
delivered at B to 5 cents.
Continuing the example, if power had been offered to the ISO's dispatch
service at these different prices, the ISO would have been offered power at A at 3
cents and power at B at 5 cents. Given the network constraint, some of the 3 cent
power would not have been taken;, instead, the ISO would have dispatched the
remaining power at B, paying 5 cents. The consumer at B would have paid 5
cents for all its power, even though part of the power would have come from A at
3 cents. [Ref. 2:pp. 17]
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The difference, at location B, between the 5-cent price paid and 3-cent price will
equal the price for transmission, i.e., 2-cents. The ISO will set the price of transmission
between locations based on the price of electricity sold through the exchange at those
different locations. The transmission prices will apply to all users of the transmission
system. [Ref. ll:Section I.C.3]
The ISO will create congestion contracts for customers entering long-term
generation agreements which require using the transmission system. These contracts will
give the customer the right to transport all their contracted electricity over the
transmission lines. Under this circumstance, the customer will not be subject to the
market congestion of the transmission network. [Ref. ll:Section I.C.3]
3. Distribution
The investor-owned utilities will retain the ownership and control of their
distribution facilities, which will remain regulated in order to maintain system reliability.
This will ensure that non-discriminatory service is provided to all customers.
The cost of distribution services will no longer be determined by the marginal cost
of service but by a method called Performance Based Ratemaking (PBR). Regulators
believe that the marginal cost of service has become too difficult and complex to maintain
in the new competitive electricity market. [Ref. 1 1 :Section III.E] PBR is an incentive
type of ratemaking which establishes benchmarks to measure the utility's performance.
Performance,above the benchmark would receive financial rewards, performance below
the benchmark would result in a financial penalties. Similar to cost of service, each
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utility will be measured against benchmarks unique to its distribution area. [Ref.
ll:SectionIII.E.l]
To date, the benchmarks and the performance measurements for PBR have not yet
been established. Until then, customers will pay the distribution rate established in the
applicable June 10, 1996 rate schedule.
4. Customer Related Charges (Revenue Cycle Services)
The California Public Utility Commission has decided to unbundle revenue cycle
services from the distribution services to help promote competition in the new electricity
market. This decision will provide energy suppliers with three billing options:
a. Consolidated energy supplier bill.
b. Consolidated distribution company billing
c. Dual billing.
Each option is discussed below:
a. Consolidated Energy Supplier Billing.
Revenue cycle services are provided by the energy supplier under this
option. Distribution services provided by the local distribution utility to the customer
will be billed to the energy supplier. The energy supplier will present the customer with a
consolidated bill for all electricity service.
b. Consolidated Distribution Company Billing.
Under this billing option, the local distribution company will provide
revenue cycle services. The energy supplier will bill the distribution company for the
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customer's energy use; the distribution company will then present the customer with a
consolidated bill.
c. Dual Billing.
This billing option separates energy service from distribution services.
Therefore, both the energy supplier and distribution company will provide revenue cycle
services and bill the customer separately. [Ref. 13:The PG&E Model]
The unbundling of revenue cycle services is only applicable to customers who
receive electricity from suppliers other than their local utility company.
5. Competitive Transition Charge
Assembly Bill 1890 authorizes the collection of a Competitive Transition Charge
(CTC) to recover the loss from the uneconomical assets of the IOUs. Legislators feel the
IOUs should not be completely responsible for the cost of uneconomical assets acquired
under regulation. An uneconomical asset is an asset whose book value exceeds its market
value. The CTC covers regulatory assets, existing power purchase obligations, and
uneconomical utility generating assets. (Ref. 1 1 : Section I .A]
All customer groups will be allocated a portion of the CTC based on the equal
percent of marginal cost (EPMC) method. Once allocated, the transition cost will be
collected as a surcharge based on a percentage of the customer's bill. [Ref. 1 1 : Section V]
The CTC will be collected during a transition period that will begin January 1, 1998 and
not extend beyond December 31, 2001, with a few exceptions. [Ref. 10:Section 367.a -
367.e] It should be noted that customers who contract electricity from suppliers other
than their local IOU, must still pay the CTC. [Ref. 10:Section370]
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E. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, electricity suppliers will compete for retail business, which should
drive electricity rates below those set by regulation. Retail customers will have to decide
who will provide their electricity. The decision may be as simple as staying with the
local utility company or as complex as monitoring the market to find the best rate among
competing suppliers.
The transmission of electricity will maintain the structure of a monopoly, run by
an Independent System Operator, to ensure system safety and reliability. The cost of
transmission will depend on where electricity is procured and the amount of network
congestion between the supplier and customer.
The local utility will maintain control of distribution facilities and remain
regulated to maintain system reliability and access. The cost of distribution will
eventually be determined using an incentive ratemaking method, called Performance
Based Ratemaking.
Revenue cycle services will be provided by either the supplier, the distribution
utility, or both. The customer will be indifferent to who provides the revenue cycle
services because the cost is usually negligible in relation to the rest of the bill. The
provider will likely be determined by the electricity supplier based on the economic
consequences of the service.
Finally, during a four year transition period, customers will be charged a
competitive transition fee to recover the uneconomical assets acquired by the IOUs as a
result of regulation. The CTC will appear as a surcharge to all customers' bills.
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However, legislators are committed to ensuring that customers will not experience a rate
increase as a result of the CTC if they purchase electricity at a rate equal to or less than





This chapter compares the cost of electricity for a Navy organization before and
after deregulation. The comparison was conducted in four parts. First, electricity
consumption and demand for the organization was forecast. Second, the forecast was
applied to the organization's regulated rate schedule. Third, the forecast was also applied
to the projected cost of the deregulated services. Finally, the costs were compared.
This analysis was conducted on the Naval Postgraduate School's Main Station,
which is categorized as a large commercial/industrial electricity user with demand equal
to or greater than 1000 kilowatts (kW). The main station receives electrical power from
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) and is charged according to PG&E's E-20 Rate
Schedule.
B. ELECTRICITY FORECAST
The electricity forecast was conducted to provide an electricity consumption base
with which to compare costs. The electricity forecast for the main station consists of a
forecast for consumption and a forecast for demand. Data points were collected directly
from PG&E electric bills for 24 months starting September 1 994 ana ending September
1996.(See Appendix A for data)
The billing cycles normally begin the last week of the previous billing month and
end the third week of the current billing month. The cycles do not pose a problem except
when the seasons change. This creates bills which include charges from both seasons.
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Because the seasons' charges are distinguishable, they are separated and paired with
similar seasons. For example, November's bill starts the winter season but includes
summer charges for the last week of October. The charges for October are separated
from the November bill and paired with the summer bills.
February 1995's data included total energy consumption only and did not provide
the period's demand. Therefore, the demand was assumed to be the average of January
1995's and March 1995's demand.
1. Energy Consumption Forecast
The energy consumption forecast is conducted by forecasting the monthly energy
consumption and then allocating the consumption between the PG&E time periods.
a. Monthly Energy Forecast
As Figure 2 indicates, the Main Station's monthly energy consumption
does not indicate any significant difference between the summer and winter seasons but
does indicate a slight decrease in trend. However, a closer look at the electric bills
reveals the number of days per billing cycle varies from month to month. Therefore, an
average daily consumption was calculated based on the monthly total divided by the


































Figure 2. NPS Main Station Monthly Electricity Consumption.
Figure 3 confirms the decreasing trend indicated by Figure 2 but also
indicates seasonality. The seasonality occurs every six months which correlates to the
school's academic breaks. These breaks occur between June/July and December/January.
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Figure 3. Average Daily Electricity Consumption.
Based on the trend and seasonality of the energy consumption data, the
Classical Decomposition method of times series analysis is used. The Classical
Decomposition method
,
in general, creates a seasonal index for each period by removing
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the seasonality from the data. It then calculates a regression equation based on the
deseasonalized data, which is the trend. The forecast is then the product of the regression
equation and the seasonal index. [Ref. 14]
This discussion will be limited to the results of the analysis and will not
discuss the actual calculations. The calculations are contained in Appendix B.
Figure 4 validates the decomposition forecast by comparing it to the
average daily consumption. This forecast is then used to calculate the monthly
consumption by simply multiplying the forecast times the number of days per month.






ft 6 .a £ c oi it o ii £ c en u O ^- "^ "^Oqu.< -><Oqu.<-5<
• Daily Forecast —«— Daily Average
Figure 4. Daily Forecast vs. Average Daily Electricity Consumption.
b. Monthly Consumption Allocation
To accurately predict electricity costs, the monthly consumption is further
divided between summer and winter, and further into time-of-use (TOU). Pacific Gas
and Electric TOU rate schedules charge costs based on the season and also according to
peak, partial peak, and off peak. Summer is defined as May 1 st through October 31 s and
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winter as November 1 st through April 30 . Table 2 displays PG&E's periods as defined
in their E-20 Rate Schedule.
Period Summer
(May 1 st -Oct. 31 st)
Winter
(Nov. 1 st -Apr. 30th)





0830- 1200 and 1800 -2130,
Mon. - Fri. (except holidays)
0830-2130, Mon. -Fri.
(except holidays)
Off Peak 2130-0830, Mon. -Fri.
All day, Sat., Sun. and
holidays
2130-0830, Mon. -Fri.
All day, Sat., Sun. and
holidays
Table 2. PG&E E-20 Rate Schedule Time Periods.
The first step in analyzing the period allocation was to calculate the
proportion each period contributed toward total consumption. The percentages for peak,
summer partial peak, summer off peak, winter partial peak, and winter off peak do not
vary significantly between periods.(See Appendix C for calculations.) Therefore, the
consumption allocation is calculated as the period average applied to the monthly
forecast.
Table 3 shows the daily forecast, monthly forecast, and allocation of
consumption based on the TOU .percentages. These consumption forecasts are used for
the analysis.
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Month Daily kWh Monthly kWh Peak Partial Peak Off Peak
October 44,654 1,384,274 308,278 329,457 746,539
November 43,808 1,314,240 N/A 596,928 717,312
December 43,258 1,340,998 N/A 609,081 731,917
January 41,064 1,272,984 N/A 578,189 694,795
February 43,375 1,214,500 N/A 551,626 662,874
March 43,891 1,360,621 N/A 617,994 742,627
April 43,914 1,317,420 N/A 598,372 719,048
May 42,080 1,335,480 297,411 317,844 720,224
June 42,538 1,276,140 284,196 303,721 688,222
July 40,378 1,251,718 278,758 297,909 675,052
August 42,649 1,322,119 294,436 314,664 713,019
September 43,154 1,294,620 288,312 308,120 698,189
Table 3. Forecast of Daily and Monthly Electricity Consumption.
2. Demand Forecast
Pacific Gas and Electric calculates the demand for each time period based on the
maximum demand for that period. The maximum demand is determined as the highest
average demand calculated over 30 minute intervals for the entire billing cycle. The
demand charge is not based on a cumulative amount like energy, but a charge applied to
the single highest average demand for the specific period.
A review of the demand data revealed that each season and period should be
analyzed individually. The analysis for each period is presented below.
a. Summer Demand
The summer season, as defined in Table 2, is divided into three periods,
peak, partial peak, and off peak. The demand from each period is graphed in Figure 5.
All three periods show a trend decrease. However, there appears to be an anomaly in
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September 1995's data. NPS personnel were questioned regarding possible causes for the
anomaly but no insight was provided. Therefore, September 1995's data was removed
prior to any analysis.
















Peak Partial Peak -Off Peak
Figure 5. Summer Demand.
A demand forecast for each month was calculated as the average demand
for the respective month. This method was used because the data was limited after the
demand was divided between periods. Table 4 is the result of the demand forecast for the
summer months. Since September 1995's data was removed, September 1996 demand
was used as the forecast for September.
Summer Peak (kW) Partial peak (kW) Off Peak
October 2,669 2,672 2,418
May 2,672 2,663 2,426
June 2,596 2,598 2,359
July 2,573 2,567 2,348
August 2,590 2,557 2,328
September 2,630 2,582 2,349
Table 4. Summer Demand Forecast.
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b. Winter Demand
The demand periods change in the winter to partial peak and off peak only.
Essentially, the summer peak period becomes partial peak. Otherwise, the time periods
do not change. The analysis for winter demand was conducted in the same manner as the
summer. As indicated in Figure 6, the winter data had an anomaly in the off peak
demand for November 1994 which could not be explained. Therefore, this data point was
removed from the analysis. The forecast for winter demand was calculated the same as
the summer demand; the results appear in Table 5.(See Appendix D for calculations.)
. Partial Peak . Off Peak
Figure 6. Winter Demand.







Table 5. Winter Demand Forecast.
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C. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC RATE SCHEDULE E-20
Pacific Gas and Electric's E-20 Rate Schedule applies to all PG&E customers
with maximum demands of 1 000 kilowatts (kW) or greater. The schedule further divides
service into three categories, primary, secondary, and transmission. NPS's Main Station
receives power under the primary schedule. Under the E-20 Rate Schedule, the customer
pays a demand charge, energy charge, and customer charge. This cost estimate will
include these costs only and will not include any adjustments.
1. Cost of Demand
The demand charge is the sum of each period's demand costs. Demand costs are
calculated by multiplying each period's demand times the respective period's rate. The
demand charge for the Main Station is predicted by multiplying the demand forecasts in
Table 4 and Table 5 by the demand costs in Table 6.
Season
Demand Cost per kW







Table 6. PG&E Rate Schedule E-20P.
Table 7 lists both the demand costs by month and calculates the annual cost. The
total demand cost of $345,238.35 is used below to calculate the total electricity cost.(See




TotalOn Peak Partial Peak Off Peak
October $31,494.20 $7,080.80 $6,165.90 $44,740.90
November $0.00 $7,314.00 $6,252.60 $13,566.60
December $0.00 $7,367.00 $6,466.80 $13,833.80
January $0.00 $7,215.95 $6,420.90 $13,636.85
February $0.00 $7,218.60 $6,426.00 $13,644.60
March $0.00 $7,279.55 $6,413.25 $13,692.80
April $0.00 $7,088.75 $6,257.70 $13,346.45
May $31,529.60 $7,056.95 $6,165.90 $44,752.45
June $30,632.80 $6,884.70 $6,186.30 $43,703.80
July $30,361.40 $6,802.55 $6,015.45 $43,179.40
August $30,562.00 $6,776.05 $5,936.40 $43,274.45
September $31,034.00 $6,842.30 $5,989.95 $43,866.25
Total $185,614.00 $84,927.20 $74,697.15 $345,238.35
Table 7. Forecast Demand Costs.
2. Cost of Energy
The energy cost forecast is calculated in the same manner as the demand forecast.
Table 8 lists the energy charges for PG&E's E-20P Rate Schedule. These values will be
multiplied by the respective period's energy forecast from Table 3.
Season
Energy Cost per kWh





Table 8. PG&E Rate Schedule E-20P.
Table 9 lists the monthly and annual energy cost calculations. The annual cost of




TotalOn Peak Partial Peak Off Peak
October $19,081.96 $15,883.12 $34,617.02 $69,582.10
November $0.00 $33,571.23 $33,849.95 $67,421.18
December $0.00 $34,254.72 $34,539.16 $68,793.88
January $0.00 $32,517.35 $32,787.38 $65,304.73
February $0.00 $31,023.45 $31,281.02 $62,304.47
March $0.00 $34,755.98 $35,044.57 $69,800.55
April $0.00 $33,652.44 $33,931.88 $67,584.32
May $18,469.22 $15,323.26 $33,396.79 $67,189.27
June $17,648.57 $14,642.39 $31,912.85 $64,203.81
July $17,310.87 $14,362.19 $31,302.16 $62,975.22
August $18,284.48 $15,169.95 $33,062.69 $66,517.12
September $17,904.18 $14,854.47 $32,375.02 $65,133.67
Total $108,699.28 $290,010.55 $398,100.49 $796,810.32
Table 9. Forecast Energy Costs.
3. Customer Charge
Rate Schedule E-20P charges $310.00 per meter per month for customer charges.
The main station has one meter and therefore pays $3 10.00 per month or $3,720.00
annually.
4. Total Electricity Cost
As previously stated, the total electricity cost is the sum of the demand costs,
energy costs, and customer charges. Based on the forecast data and above calculations
,
the cost of electricity under Rate Schedule E-20P is $1,1 45,768.67.(See Appendix E for
calculations.)
D. UNBUNDLED COST OF ELECTRICITY
When the research for this analysis was conducted, many deregulation issues were
unresolved, including the investor owned utilities (IOUs) unbundled cost of electricity .
To progress toward rate unbundling, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
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requested that the IOUs file a rate unbundling application. This analysis used the
application filed by Pacific Gas and Electric (PC E) for three reasons:
1
.
The PG&E application unbundles electricity costs specifically for the E-20
Rate Schedule, and therefore provides the best comparison.
2. It is likely that NPS will initially retain electricity service from PG&E under
deregulation.
3. The transmission and distribution costs are too uncertain to accurately predict
electricity costs from a supplier other than PG&E.
Pacific Gas and Electric' s electricity costs in the application are unbundled into
six categories, they are Power Exchange price (generation), transmission, distribution,
Competitive Transition Charge (CTC), nuclear decommissioning, and
social/environmental.
The nuclear decommissioning cost is a mandatory (nonbypassable) charge related
to the decommissioning of uneconomical nuclear generating facilities. Assembly Bill
1 890 states this cost will be separate from the CTC and will fully recover the cost of these
facilities. The social/environmental charge will provide funding for low income
electricity users, energy efficiency and conservation programs, and public interest
electricity research and development. The social/environmental cost is nonbypassable
and will be included in the local distribution cost.
The unbundled cost estimate divides-the calculation into two parts; the cost of
service, which includes generation, transmission, distribution, and social/environmental
charges, and the transition cost, which includes the CTC and nuclear decommissioning
costs.
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Pacific Gas and Electric's unbundled rates forecast listed in Table 10 are based on
the class average and do not differentiate between peak, partial peak, and off peak
periods. The cost estimate uses the 1998 rates and assumes theses rates represent the
rates after deregulation. The unbundled costs are all charged according to consumption
per kilowatt hour (kW).
Unbundled Costs (per kWh)




Competitive Transition Charge (CTC) $0.0290
Nuclear Decommission (ND) $0.0003
Total Rate $0.0678
Table 10. PG&E E-20 Average Unbundled Rates Forecast. (Ref. 15:p. 2)
The estimated cost of service and transition cost are calculated by multiplying the
monthly energy forecast from Table 3 by the unbundled rates forecast in Table 10. Table
1 1 provides the calculated cost of services and Table 1 2 shows the calculated transition
cost. The unbundled cost of electricity from PG&E does not list any customer charges
therefore, it is assumed customers who receive all electricity services from PG&E do not
pay customer charges. The estimated unbundled cost of electricity is the sum of the cost
of service and transition costs which equal $1,063,450. 72.(See Appendix F for
calculations.)
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Month Generation Trans. Dist. S/E Totals
October $33,222.58 $3,183.83 $13,289.03 $3,599.11 $53,294.55
November $31,541.76 $3,022.75 $12,616.70 $3,417.02 $50,598.23
December $32,183.95 $3,084.30 $12,873.58 $3,486.59 $51,62842
January $30,551.62 $2,927.86 $12,220.65 $3,309.76 $49,009.89
February $29,148.00 $2,793.35 $11,659.20 $3,157.70 $46,758.25
March $32,654.90 $3,129.43 $13,061.96 $3,537.61 $52,383.90
April $31,618.08 $3,030.07 $12,647.23 $3,425.29 $50,720.67
May $32,051.52 $3,071.60 $12,820.61 $3,472.25 $51,415.98
June $30,627.36 $2,935.12 $12,250.94 $3,317.96 $49,131.38
July $30,041.23 $2,878.95 $12,016.49 $3,254.47 $48,191.14
August $31,730.86 $3,040.87 $12,692.34 $3,437.51 $50,901.58
September $31,070.88 $2,977.63 $12,428.35 $3,366.01 $49,842.87
Totals $376,442.74 $36,075.76 $150,577.08 $40,781.28 $603,876.86
Table 11. Cost Estimate for Unbundled Cost of Service.
Month CTC ND Total
October $40,143.95 $415.28 $40,559.23
November $38,112.96 $394.27 $38,507.23
December $38,888.94 $402.30 $39,291.24
January $36,916.54 $381.90 $37,298.44
February $35,220.50 $364.35 $35,584.85
March $39,458.01 $408.19 $39,866.20
April $38,205.18 $395.23 $38,600.41
May $38,728.92 $400.64 $39,129.56
June $37,008.06 $382.84 $37,390.90
July $36,299.82 $375.52 $36,675.34
August $38,341.45 $396.64 $38,738.09
September $37,543.98 $388.39 $37,932.37
Total $454,868.31 $4705.55 $459,573.86
Table 12. Cost Estimate for Unbundled Transition Cost.
E. COST OF ELECTRICITY COMPARISON
This section compares the regulated and deregulated cost of electricity calculated
above. The generation costs compare the E-20P energy charges and the Power Exchange
price. The transmission and distribution costs compare the E-20P demand charge and the
unbundled transmission, distribution, and social/environmental costs. The CTC includes
both the transition charge and nuclear decommissioning.
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The unbundled cost of electricity is 7.18 percent, or $82,317.95, cheaper than the
regulated rates as illustrated in Table 13. More significantly, the unbundled cost of
generation is $420,367.58 less than the regulated price; transmission and distribution are
also cheaper under deregulation by $1 1 7,804.23. These savings are largely offset by the







Generation $796,810.32 $376,442.74 $420,367.58
Transmission
& Distribution $345,238.35 $227,434.12 $117,804.23
CTC $0.00 $459,573.84 -$459,573.86
Customer Charge $3,720.00 $0.00 $3,720.00
Total $1,145,768.67 $1,063,450.72 $82,317.95
Table 13. Electricity Cost Comparison.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The cost analysis completed does indicate that deregulation should provide lower
electricity costs for Navy organizations classified as large industrial/commercial users.
The concerns addressed by the legislature and the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) do indicate that similar marginal savings should be realized by other customers
as well.
As previously discussed, the Competitive Transition Charge (CTC) is designed to
recover the costs of uneconomical assets for the investor owned utilities (IOUs). This
charge equates to $459,573.72 for the Naval Postgraduate School's Main Station. If
these costs are recovered as planned, significant future cost savings would be realized
after the transition period ends on December 3 1 , 200 1
.
In theory, deregulation should provide many opportunities for cost savings.
However, many uncertainties remain to be resolved. The effects of deregulation on the
electricity market will not be realized until the transition period is complete and a truly
competitive generation market exists.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research and analysis completed, it is recommended that the base
commander who receives electricity from one of the three IOUs continue to retain
electricity service from that supplier. Reasons to retain their service are:
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Initial analysis indicates a possible reduction in the cost of electricity under
deregulation.
Retail customers of the IOUs are obligated to pay the Competitive Transition
Charge regardless of their supplier, therefore the CTC is inescapable. [Ref.
1 1 :Section V] For example, if NPS's Main Station chooses to contract
electricity from a direct access supplier, the total cost of electricity would
equal the contract price plus the CTC of approximately $400,000.
Customers who purchase electricity from suppliers at a price greater than the
Power Exchange price may incur an increase in total costs. Customers who
purchase electricity from the IOUs would not incur a rate increase because the
mandatory buy-sell policy discussed in Chapter III directs the IOUs to
purchase their electricity from the PX. This would only apply during the
transition period due to the CTC. [Ref. 10:Section 367.E.2]
The uncertainties in key services, such as transmission and distribution, could
increase costs.
Significant cost savings could result after elimination of the Competitive
Transition Charge.
On January 1, 2002, if the CPUC removes CTC and competition emerges as
planned, Navy organizations should solicit bids for their electricity service.
C. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Follow-on research could be conducted in the following areas:
• Electricity rate comparison before and after deregulation.
• The cost of electricity contracted through an aggregate buy for the entire
Department of the Navy and possibly the Department of Defense.
•
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APPENDIX C - ENERGY FORECAST









Winter Off PeakStarting Ending Peak Partial Peak
|
Off Peak
23-Sep-94 24-Oct-94 297,043 317,671 760,486 1,375,200 0.2160 0.2310 0.0000 0.5530
24-Oct-94 31-Oct-94 88,608 95,424 190,848 374,880 0.2364 0.2545 0.0000 0.5091
01-Nov-94 22-Nov-94 434,861 553,459 988,320 0.0000 0.0000 0.4400 0.5600
22-Nov-94 22-Dec-94 647,885 772,915 1,420,800 0.0000 0.0000 0.4560 0.5440
22-Dec-94 24-Jan-95 610,548 860,652 1,471,200 0.0000 0.0000 0.4150 0.5850
24-Jan-95 23-Feb-95 — — 1,413,600 0.0000 0.0000 — —
23-Feb-95 24-Mar-95 642,816 739,584 1,382,400 0.0000 0.0000 0.4650 0.5350
24-Mar-95 24-Apr-95 622,339 788,861 1,411,200 0.0000 0.0000 0.4410 0.5590
24-Apr-95 30-Apr-95 146,234 175,750 321,984 0.0000 0.0000 0.4542 0.5458
01-May-95 23-May-95 229,414 245,513 544,689 1,019,616 0.2250 0.2408 0.0000 0.5342
23-May-95 22-Jun-95 290,606 313,373 735,221 1,339,200 0.2170 0.2340 0.0000 0.5490
22-Jun-95 24-Jul-95 285,610 303,206 764,784 1,353,600 0.2110 0.2240 0.0000 0.5650
24-Jul-95 22-Aug-95 296,218 314,093 666,489 1,276,800 0.2320 0.2460 0.0000 0.5220
22-Aug-95 21-Sep-95 302,669 322,937 725,594 1,351,200 0.2240 0.2390 0.0000 0.5370
21-Sep-95 20-Oct-95 295,488 316,224 684,288 1,296,000 0.2280 0.2440 0.0000 0.5280
20-Oct-95 31-Oct-95 115,279 123,818 300,296 539,393 0.2137 0.2296 0.0000 0.5567
01-Nov-95 21-Nov-95 399,919 483,888 883,807 0.0000 0.0000 0.4525 0.5475
21-Nov-95 21-Dec-95 623,760 732,240 1,356,000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4600 0.5400
21-Dec-95 23-Jan-96 593,501 812,899 1,406,400 0.0000 0.0000 0.4220 0.5780
23-Jan-96 22-Feb-96 636,718 738,482 1 ,375,200 0.0000 0.0000 0.4630 0.5370
22-Feb-96 22-Mar-96 632,890 696,710 1,329,600 0.0000 0.0000 0.4760 0.5240
22-Mar-96 22-Apr-96 619,421 750,979 1,370,400 0.0000 0.0000 0.4520 0.5480
22-Apr-96 30-Apr-96 209,563 202,759 412,322 0.0000 0.0000 0.5083 0.4917
01-May-96 22-May-96 216,367 229,975 502,136 948,478 0.2281 0.2425 0.0000 0.5294
22-May-96 21-Jun-96 293,040 314,160 712,800 1,320,000 0.2220 0.2380 0.0000 0.5400
21-Jun-96 23-Jul-96 280,039 298,620 748,541 1,327,200 0.2110 0.2250 0.0000 0.5640
23-Jul-96 21-Aug-96 296,050 313,992 671,558 1,281,600 0.2310 0.2450 0.0000 0.5240
21-Aug-97 20-Sep-97 297,036 317,016 717,948 1,332,000 0.2230 0.2380 0.0000 0.5390
Average: Summer (S) 0.2227 0.2380 — 0.5393
Winter (W) — — 0.4542 0.5458
Energy Allocation
Peak Partial Peak Off Peak
Daily Number Monthly 22.27% 23.80% (S) 53.93% (S)
Month kWh of Days Total 45.42% (W) 54.58% (W)
October 44,654 31 1,384,274 308,278 329,457 746,539
November 43,808 30 1,314,240 596,928 717,312
December 43,258 31 1 ,340,998 609,081 731,917
January 41 .064 31 1,272,984 578,189 694,795
February 43,375 28 1,214,500 551,626 662,874
March 43,891 31 1,360,621 617,994 742,627
April 43,914 30 1,317,420 598,372 719,048
May 43,080 31 1,335,480 297,411 317,844 720,224
June 42,538 30 1,276,140 284,196 303,721 688,222
July 40,378 31 1,251,718 278,758 297,909 675,052
August 42,649 31 1,322,119 294,436 314,664 713,019
September 43,154 30 1,294,620 288,312 308,120 698,189
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APPENDIX D - DEMAND FORECAST




On Peak | Partial Peak
|
Off Peak
Oct-94 2,695 2,692 2,424
May-95 2,685 2,683 2,431
Jun-95 2,635 2,616 2,373
Jul-95 2,625 2,606 2,361
Aug-95 2,596 2,556 2,320
Sep-95 2,889 2,848 2,637
Oct-95 2,642 2,652 2,412
May-96 2,659 2,642 2,421
Jun-96 2,556 2,580 2,344
Jul-96 2,520 2,527 2,335
Aug-96 2,584 2,558 2,335
Sep-96 2,630 2,582 2,349
Summer Demand with September 1995 Removed
Month
Demand (kW)
On Peak Partial Peak Off Peak
Oct-94 2,695 2,692 2,424
May-95 2,685 2,683 2,431
Jun-95 2,635 2,616 2,373
Jul-95 2.625 2,606 2,361
Aug-95 2,596 2,556 2,320
Oct-95 2,642 2,652 2,412
May-96 2,659 2,642 2,421
Jun-96 2,556 2,580 2,344
Jul-96 2,520 2,527 2,335
Aug-96 2,584 2,558 2,335
Sep-96 2,630 2,582 2,349
Summer Demand Forecast
Month Peak | Partial Peak | Off Peak
Oct 2,669 2,672 2,418
May 2,672 2,663 2,426
Jun 2,596 2,598 2,359
Jul 2,573 2,567 2,348
Aug 2,590 2,557 2,328































APPENDIX E - PG&E COST OF ELECTRICITY
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